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Jannuzzi: Affirmative Action

HOPWOOD, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION: CAN ANYONE'S OX BE GORED?1
INTRODUCTION
Seeking to right a wrong, affirmative action2 was born of the
heels of the advancements made in the area of civil rights during
the nineteen sixties. The Civil Rights Act of 19643 and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965' were, as legislative entities, far
1 See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALrrY OF CONSENT 133 (1975). In this
highly influential treatise, the author writes:
The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and
the lesson of contemporary history have been the same for at
least a generation: discrimination on the basis of race is
illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and
destructive of democratic society.
Now this is to be
unlearned and we are told that this is not a matter of
fundamental principle but only a matter of whose ox is
gored.
Id.
2 See 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1964-65).
The term affirmative action comes from
this order, later codified into the United States Code, which mandated that
government agencies and private contractors employ "affirmative action" to
"insure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during
employment, without regard to their race, creed , color, or national origin."
Id. See also Randall Kennedy, Persuasionand Distrust: A Comment of the
Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1327 (1986). "[Alffirmative
action refers to policies that provide preferences based explicitly on
membership in a designated group. Affirmative action policies vary widely,
ranging from [soft] forms that might include special recruitment efforts to
[hard] forms that might include reserving a specific number of openings
exclusively for members of the preferred groups." Id. at 1327 n. 1.
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) et seq. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
provides: "No person shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance." Id.
4 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965). This section provides in pertinent part: "No
voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any state or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of any right of any citizen of
the United States to vote on account of race or color. .. ." Id.
549
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reaching in their aspiration to enforce the civil rights of the still
disenfranchised black community. 5 Ten years prior to this, the
Supreme Court of the United States in Brown v. Board of
Education6 ended de jure segregation. 7 From the judiciary and
from the legislature the message was clear, all citizens were
entitled to equal rights and privileges under the laws of the United
States.! While this idea was put forth clearly enough, the manner
by which this was to be accomplished was not explicitly
expressed. 9 Ending de jure segregation was the first step. Much
more a challenge was eradicating the residual effects left by the

structures that created it. The affirmative action debate as it
exists today focuses on the constitutionality of measures that do,
in effect, seek to treat people differently.' 0 On one side of the
argument are those who feel that the laws of state and federal
governments must be "colorblind" 1' in its vision, and that

I Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1327.
6 347

U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality
of a segregated public school system. Id. at 488. The Court ruled that the
separate but equal doctrine (see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896))
"deprived the children of minority groups of equal educational opportunities"
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection under
the7 law. Id. at 493
Id. at 494.
8 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 425 (6th ed. 1990). De jure is discussed "as a
condition in which there has been a total compliance with all requirements of
law, of right

.... "

Id. De jure can be contrasted with de facto which is

defined as "in fact in deed, actually." Id. at 416.
9 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (stating " the
cases below are remanded to the District Courts to take such proceedings and
enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and
proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all
deliberate speed the parties to these cases.").
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States... nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws." Id.
" See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) "Our constitution is
colorblind," is the phrase uttered by Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in
Plessy and bears the distinction of being one of the most quoted phrases in the
Court's history. Id. at 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Plessy, the plaintiff
petitioner challenged the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute that required
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treating people differently on the basis of race can never again be
allowed.12 On the other side lies the idea that such measures are
the only way to bring all of society's members onto level playing

fields. The topic is highly charged with even the original
proponents of the Civil Rights movement, once united, becoming
divided over this very issue.1 3 This comment will focus on the

constitutionality of race-based preferences, leaving the formidable
task of addressing the validity of such programs from a social
policy standpoint to others. This comment will limit its focus to
discussing the various arguments surrounding affirmative action
and its treatment by the Supreme Court over the past twenty years
and provide an interpretation of the current state of the law in
regard to affirmative action in the context of admission policies of
institutions of higher education.
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE SUPREME COURT

The opinions written in Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke14 provide the most appropriate place to jump into the
railway companies carrying passengers in their cars to provide equal, but
separate accommodations for the "white and colored races" Id. at 537. The
Supreme Court found the Statute to be constitutionally sound in that a legal
distinction between the races "has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of
the two races or re-establish a state of involuntary servitude." Id. at 543.
Justice Harlan disagreed with the Court's upholding a "separate but equal"
policy of segregated passenger cars on trains. Id at 554. He stated that the
Thirteenth Amendment "prevents the imposition of any burdens or disabilities
that constitute badges of slavery or servitude." Id. at 555.
" Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1327.
14 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Bakke, plaintiff filed an action under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in which he sought a seat in the incoming class of the medical
school after he was rejected two times in as many years. Id. at 277. The
plaintiff contended that the special admission program (designed to boost
minority enrollment) operated to deprive him of a spot in the school on the
basis of his status as a non-minority. Id. at 277-78. The Supreme Court held
that the University's special admission program was invalid and that Bakke
must be given a seat in the incoming class, but reversed the lower court's
judgment enjoining the school from considering race in its admission process.
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affirmative action fray. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of
the Court. 15 The plurality opinion was, however, accompanied
by a confusing array of part concurrences and dissents. 6
Ultimately, the Supreme Court's review of the medical school's
admission policy yielded a decision that granted Bakke a seat in
the incoming class and held that racial classifications must be
reviewed under exacting scrutiny, 17 but nonetheless remarked that
a State has a " substantial interest that legitimately may be served
by a properly devised admissions program involving the
competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin.""8 With no
majority opinion, 9 the continued authority of Justice Powell's
decision has been challenged with lower courts diverging in their
interpretation of Bakke. 2 Did the Court mean that distinctions
based on race were not to be "per se" invalid?2 Were the lower
courts to interpret the holding in Bakke to stand for the
Id. at 320. The Court struck down the University's affirmative action program
as being violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id.
15
Id. at 269.
16
1d. at 271.
'7 See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-6, at 100002 (1978) (stating that for a law to survive strict scrutiny, the standard of
review employed in analyzing any classifications based upon race or alienage,
the classification must further a compelling state interest by the most tailored
means available).
18Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
'9 Id. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court with separate
opinions being filed by Justices Brennan, White, Marshal, Stevens and
Blackmun. Id. at 272
1 See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating "Justice
Powell's argument in Bakke garnered only his vote and has never represented
the view of the Court in Bakke or in any other case.").
21Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316. The Court states that
In recent years Harvard College has expanded the concept of
diversity to include students from disadvantaged economic
racial and ethnic groups... In such an admission program
race or ethnic background may be deemed a plus in a
particular applicant's file, yet it does not insulate the
individual from comparison with all other candidates for
available seats.
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proposition that the educational benefits derived from a diverse
student body were an important enough objective to satisfy the
first prong of the test administered under the strict scrutiny
standard?'
While arguably obfuscating the decision reached in Bakke, the
Court in Fullilove v. Ktutznicl at least points out what it was not
doing. Again without a majority, the plurality opinion was
written by Chief Justice Burger who by "not adopting either
expressly or implicitly" 24 the level of review required in
analyzing race based classification preferences as expressed in
Bakke, seems to be calling for a less stringent test for such

classifications.'

Unfortunately, those trying to understand (or

worse, predict) the mindset of the Court at this time were left
struggling to define just what exactly a "close examination"
would entail. 26

I Tribe, supra note 16, at 1001 (stating that the state interest must be
compelling and narrowly tailored to satisfy strict scrutiny).
1 448 U.S. 448 (1979). In Fuililove, an association of construction
contractors and subcontractors engaged in the ventilation and air conditioning
business challenged on constitutional grounds the legality of a federal 10 % set
aside program that earmarked federal funds used for local public work projects
for businesses owned and controlled by members of statutorily identified
minority groups. Id. at 453. The Supreme Court found that the program was
valid in that Congress did have the ability under its Spending Powers to pass
legislation that accomplished constitutional goals of economic opportunity. Id.
at 490. Further, the Court stated that while its holding did not adopt the
formulas expressed in Bakke, the Fullilove set aside program would have
nonetheless survived either of the tests articulated in the several opinions. Id.
at 492 (discussing the judicial standards of review of strict scrutiny and
intermediate level scrutiny).
24 Id. at 491.
1 As opposed to strict scrutiny, a middle tier or intermediate level of
scrutiny is here being called upon. Id. at 491-92. Intermediate level review
requires that there must first be an important government interest and, second,
the means chosen must be substantially related to achievement of that end.
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
' Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472. "A program that employs racial or ethnic
criteria, even in a remedial context, calls for close examination." Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 [1998], Art. 16

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol 14

The 1986 Supreme Court decision in Wygant v. Jackson Board
of Education27 can be viewed as a precursor to the status of the
Supreme Court's current attitude towards affirmative action.
There, the petitioner at the Court of Appeals level successfully
argued that maintaining the existence of minority teachers as role
models served as a compelling state interest thereby justifying
racial preferences in determining which people, regardless of
seniority, could be laid off.2 The Supreme Court disagreed,
finding that such a policy conflicted with Constitutional
guarantees - in this particular case "against whites and in favor of
certain minorities." 29
Following Wygant, the Supreme Court in City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co.30 distinguished between federal remedial powers
(as seen in cases such as Fullilove) and the limits imposed upon
the powers of the individual states. 3' The Court invalidated an
affirmative action plan designed to assist minority contractors that
claimed an allowance of a "generalized assertion" that there has
476 U.S. 267 (1986). In Wygant, non-minority teachers brought suit in
Federal District Court alleging equal protection violations in a collective
bargaining agreement between the Jackson school board and a teacher's union.
Id. at 271. In an effort to provide role models for minority children, that
agreement contained a provision that provided in the circumstance of teacher
lay-offs, non-minority teachers would be laid-off before minority teachers,
regardless of seniority. Id. at 272. Finding that the provision "acts to
maintain levels of minority hiring that have no relation to remedying
employment discrimination," the Court held that the provision could not be
adjudged to achieve its desired remedial purpose" and was thereby
unconstitutional. Id. at 294.
27

2 id.
29

Id. at 273.

30 488 U.S. 469 (1989). In City of Richmond, a contractor brought an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaining that the City's 30% set aside requirement
for city construction projects to use minority owned businesses was
unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him in this case. Id. at 483. The
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's finding that the set-aside program
violated both prongs of the strict scrutiny standard imposed by Fourteenth
Amendment protections in that the plan was not shown to redress prior
discrimination, nor was it narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
governmental interest. Id. at 485.
31 Id.
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been past discrimination has "no logical stopping point. " "
Claiming a preference for such action to come from the
legislature, the Court in Croson tightened the reigns of the state's
abilities to fashion discrimination remedies.
At a time when the legal waters surrounding the affirmative
action debate had seemed to settle, the Court decided Metro
Broadcasting, Inc., v. FCC.33 In Metro Broadcasting, Justice
Brennan, in his majority opinion, was finally able to apply the
standard he thought appropriate for "benign racial
classifications. " 34 Substituting the "robust exchange of ideas" 35
created by the "benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse
student body" found in Bakke36 with the "diversity of view and
information on the airwaves" 37 at issue in Metro Broadcasting,
Justice Brennan justified the preferential treatment of a group
based upon its race, and, perhaps more importantly, he did so
with an intermediate level of judicial review. The Court's new
level of review for racial classifications, as expressed in Metro
Broadcasting,would be short-lived. 8
In the period between Metro Broadcasting and the case that
defines the current opinion of the Court towards affirmative
I Id. at 488 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267,
275 (1986)).
33 497 U.S. 547 (1990). In Metro Broadcasting, plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of two minority preference programs instituted by the Federal
Communications Commission to promote diversity over the ainvaves as being

violative of the Fifth Amendment's equal protection clause. Id. at 552. The
Court ruled that such policies did not offend any Constitutional mandates
against unequal treatment under the law in that the program served an
important governmental interest in having a diverse broadcast community and

the policies were "substantially related to the achievement of that goal." Id. at
566.
Id at 565. Justice Brennan seems to be differentiating between what other
commentators had termed as "soft" measures (here, the preferential treatment
of minority members) with "hard" measures - ones that have a direct adverse
effect against the group to which they are applied.
35
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306.
36 Id.
37 Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 548.

Adarand Contractors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (overruling Metro
Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)).
38
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action, Adarand Contractors v. Pena,39 both the Court's
composition and its attitude towards affirmative action changed

once again. The three Justices who most ardently favored benign
or remedial legislation (Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blacken)
had left the Court.40 The remaining Justices who favored strict
scrutiny (Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist)
were able to apply the standard of review that they felt was
appropriate in both federal and state actions with regard to
reviewing race-based classifications. 4
In Adarand, Justice
O'Connor, who had delivered the opinion in Croson, handed
down the opinion of the Court and was joined by Justice Kennedy
and concurred in part and concurred in the judgment by Justices
Scalia and Thomas.4 2 The opinion overruled Metro Broadcasting,
holding that all racial classifications are subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny.43 The Court took pains to state that while this standard
is indeed a high hurdle to overcome, it is one that is not
impossible to meet." The holding in Adarand gives us the state
of the law as it exists today in regard to affirmative action

programs.
39 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
In Adarand, a contractor attacked the
constitutionality of the Federal Government's practice of providing financial
incentives to contractors that hired subcontractors of "socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals" as well as the use of race-based
presumptions in the categorizing of such groups. Id. at 2100. The Supreme
Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals rejecting the claim of
unconstitutionality and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id.
Speaking of the importance of clearly identifying the reasons for racial
classifications, Justice O'Connor wrote "we think that requiring strict scrutiny
is the best way to ensure that courts will consistently give racial classifications
that kind of detailed examination both as to ends and as to means." Id. at
2117. Further, such examination will "ensure that [the] most exact connection
between justification and classification" is met. Id.
'0 MARIE

T. FINN, THE AMERICAN BENCH: JUDGES OF THE NATION 19-22,

52 (8th ed. 1995-96).
41 Id.
42 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2100.
43
Id. at 2127.
44Id. at 2097. "When race based action is necessary to further a compelling
state interest such action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the
narrow tailoring test this Court has set.out in previous cases." Id.
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Following the clear message sent out in Adarand, the lower
courts have not had the problem of inconsistency that could have
been said to have once plagued the different jurisdictions.

In

1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
applied the Adarand standard in a closely watched decision that
took place on the familiar affirmative action fighting ground of
admissions programs to institutions of higher education. In
Hopwood v. Texas, ' the Fifth Circuit found that there was not
sufficient evidence presented to show "present effects of past
discrimination"' and that the law school's broad affirmative
action program for admissions that "swept in all minorities " '
regardless of whether or not a particular group was harmed in the
past was overreaching, and, in consequence, violative of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.48 With
the various interested parties anxiously watching and waiting, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari to the petitioners - an act viewed
by many to signify that the attitude of the Supreme Court toward
affirmative action plans has changed little since the decision in
Adarand.49

45 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). In Hopwood, a group of non-minority
students sued the University of Texas Law School claiming its admission
policy violated their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment as well as other
derivative violations. Id. at 938. The admission policy created different
standards for black and Mexican students than the standards placed upon white
students. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower
court's upholding the admission policy stating that, although done with the best
intentions, the Fourteenth Amendment nonetheless does not allow
discriminating in favor of certain favored classes of minority students to the
detriment of white and non-preferred minorities. Id. at 934. The Court
concluded that the school may not use race as a factor in its admissions. Id. at
935.
4Id. at 939.
47

Id.

4 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States... nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws." Id.
49 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996).
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RESPECTIVE POSITIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES
The fragmented decisions in race based classification cases that
have come before the Court demonstrate the tenuous position that
any currentattitude of the court holds. At the moment, there is a
tilt away from raced-based classifications finding support from
the nation's highest court. With the opinions so closely decided,
the Court's position could easily shift back towards a more
lenient standard of review. The composition of the Court could
change.
A current Justice's attitude towards race-based
In the
classifications could swing in the other direction.
single
vote
could
change
the
outcome
affirmative action debate, a
of a case. A brief assessment of the leanings of each of the
current Justices of the Court is perhaps instructive in weighing
the constitutionality of the various law school admission policies
that contain provisions for consideration of an applicant's race.
While not as extreme in the condemnation of affirmative action
plans as Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justice O'Connor, the
author of Adarand, nonetheless advocates the use of the strictest
level of judicial scrutiny when reviewing such plans. In
Adarand, Justice O'Connor pointed out that the notion of strict
50
scrutiny being "strict in theory, but fatal in fact" is erroneous,
and in support of this contention she cites to the case of United
States v. Paradise5 wherein "every Justice of this court agreed
that the Alabama Department of Public Safety's pervasive,
systematic and obstinate discriminatory conduct justified a
narrowly tailored raced-base remedy." 52 Justice O'Connor's
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (stating that "we wish to dispel the notion
that strict scrutiny is strict in theory, but fatal in fact.").
51480 U.S. 167 (1987). In Paradise, the Court reviewed a "one-black-forone-white" promotion requirement instituted by a District Court against the
Alabama Department of Public Safety after having found that the Department
had systematically excluded blacks from employment. Id. at 153. The Court
found that the District Court's plan was "effective, temporary, and flexible"
and was "amply justified and narrowly tailored to serve [its] legitimate and
laudable
purposes." Id. at 186.
52
Id.at 196.
50
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opinions have been consistent in this area and clearly advocate the
use of the strictest level of judicial scrutiny when reviewing
policies that take race into consideration.
Justice Scalia, who concurred in part and concurred in the
judgment in Adarand, would certainly be a tougher nut to crack
from a pro-affirmative action perspective in that he believes that
the Constitution of the United States does not allow a "creditor or
a debtor race." 53 Justice Scalia maintains this position even while
stating that individuals wronged by unlawful racial discrimination
in the past should be made whole.' In his view "[g]overnment
can never have a compelling interest in discriminating on the
basis of race in order to make up for past racial discrimination in
the opposite direction. We are one race here. It is American.""5
The sentiments of Justice Thomas echo those of Justice Scalia.
Justice Thomas argued that affirmative action programs
"undermine the moral basis of the equal protection principle."5"
Further Justice Thomas rejected differentiating programs which
are benign and programs which are invidiously discriminatory,
"in my mind, government sponsored racial discrimination based
on benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired
by malicious prejudice.
In each instance it is racial
discrimination, pure and simple."'
Chief Justice Rehnquist did not file separately in Adarand, but
joined Justice O'Connor's opinion, as he had done in Croson.8
In Fullilove, then Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Stewart's
dissent which argued that the set aside program at issue in that
case was odious to the Constitution. 9 Justice Stewart's wrote that
the elimination of detrimental classification based on race was
frustrated by the government's granting of "privilege based on
birth. " 60 With little direct testimony to go on, Chief Justice
I Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2118 (1995).
4Id.
55
Id.at 1118-19.
56
1d.at 1119.
57

id.

5sId.
at 2100.
59Fullilove, 448

U.S. at 522 (Stewart, J. dissenting).
I Id. at 530 (Stewart, J. dissenting).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998

11

Touro Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 [1998], Art. 16

560

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol 14

Rehnquist has consistently sided with those who call for an
exacting scrutiny when reviewing racial classifications.
Justice Kennedy did not file a separate opinion in Adarand but,
as he had done in City of Richmond six years earlier, joined in the
opinion written by Justice O'Connor.61

In City of Richmond,

Justice Kennedy, concurring in part, opted for strict judicial
review as the desirable standard to be applied when reviewing
race based classifications. For Justice Kennedy this standard was
more appropriate than a rule of "automatic invalidity for racial
preferences" at which other judges were hinting.62 In his view
strict scrutiny, while rigorous, nonetheless still allows "as a last
resort" 63 race conscious remedies when they provide the only
adequate remedy. 64 Further Justice Kennedy holds the strict
scrutiny standard for race conscious remedies to be consistent
with the precedents set by the Court.65 In joining with Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Adarand, one can summize that Justice
Kennedy's position on affirmative action programs remains
consistent with the thoughts he expressed in City of Richmond.
In contrast, Justice Souter has urged upholding racial
classifications in certain prescribed situations. In a separate
dissenting opinion filed in Adarand, Justice Souter, joined by
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer,' felt that the scheme
challenged in Adarand was constitutional under Fullilove. 67
Additionally, in light of the fact that Adarand did not distinguish
any differences from his case to that of the "factual premises" of
Fullilove, the Fullilove holding would be controlling and
applicable to the scheme at issue in Adarand.6" Justice Souter,
desiring to quell the effects of "lingering discrimination" 61 wrote
that employing remedial programs that might adversely effect
Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 518 (1989).
62Id. at 519.
63 Id.
64 Id.
6 1Id. at 518.
6Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2131 (Souter, J., dissenting).
IId.(Souter, J., dissenting).
669 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2133. (Souter, J., dissenting).
61
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members of a historically favored group should be allowed as the
reasonable price to be paid for a worthwhile goal. Further, the
reasonableness of such action "is in part because it is a price to
be paid only temporarily. 0 Justice Souter opined that eventually
"the effects will themselves recede in to the past becoming
attenuated and finally disappearing."
Justice Ginsburg's Adarand opinion (joined by Justice Breyer)
agreed with Justice Souter and advocates the catch up ideals that
remedial plans, such as that found in the government's challenged
plan in Adarand, provide.' She wrote that "(b)ias ... keeps up
barriers that must come down if equal opportunity and non
discrimination are ever genuinely to become part of this country's
law and practice." 73 Admonishing this bias, Justice Ginsburg
was critical of the lead opinion's interference with what she
believes is the permissible power of Congress to "help realize,
finally the equal protection of the laws the Fourteenth
Amendment has promised since 1868." 74 Further, allowing such
plans, even at the temporary expense of a particular group,
should be permissible because court review can insure that
preferences "are not so large as to trammel unduly upon the
opportunity of others, or interfere too harshly with legitimate
expectations of persons in once preferred groups." 75
On the Supreme Court bench today, perhaps the loudest voice
advocating affirmative action is that of Justice John Paul
Stevens.7 6 While conceding that racial characterizations "seldom

provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment," n and that the
standard of review for such characterizations must be "clearly
7

Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
I Id. at 2135. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
73 d. (Ginsburg, ., dissenting).
74 d. at 2136. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
71 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens was appointed to the
76 Finn, supra note 40 at 82-83.
Supreme Court of the United States by Gerald R. Ford for the term beginning
Dec. 19, 1975. Id.
I Adarand Constructors v. Pena 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2120 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
71
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identified and unquestionably legitimate" 78 Justice Stevens
warned that "[w]hen a Court becomes preoccupied with abstract
standards, it risks sacrificing common sense at the altar of formal
consistency. 79 Further, Justice Stevens stated that although there
is substantial agreement on the standard to apply regarding
classifications based upon race, that does not necessarily lead to
an agreement on "how those cases should or will be resolved." 80
He wrote:
There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a
policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one
that seeks to eradicate racial subordination.
Invidious
discrimination is an engine of oppression, subjugating a
disfavored group to enhance or maintain the power of the
majority.
Remedial race-based preferences reflect the
opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality in society. No
sensible conception of the government's constitutional
obligation to "govern impartially"

should ignore this

distinction.8 '
The influence of one of the founders of the affirmative action
movement can be seen in opinions such as Justice Stevens' and
warrants a brief discussion on its effect on the Court today. In
his writings, Justice Marshall82 proposed that affirmative action

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2122. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Here, Justice Stevens expressed his
reservation about the Court's desire to maintain "consistency" and
"congruence" in their decisions (stare decisis) and suggests that the covrt
employ the same sort of skepticism for these goals that they advocate for the
underlying issue in Adarand. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81 Id. (citation omitted).
78

79 Id. at

8

MARIE T. HOUGH, THE AMERICAN BENCH: JuDGES OF THE NATION. 52

(6th ed. 1991-1992). Justice Marshall was appointed to the Supreme Court of
the United States by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1967. Considered to be
one of the greatest actors in the modem civil rights movement, Justice
Marshall was the also the Director and Counsel Defense Legal Defense and
Educational Fund from 1940-61 and U.S. Solicitor General from 1965-67. Id.
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was not irreconcilable with constitutional mandates.'
Citing
s4
from court decisions of the past century, Justice Marshall
posited that one ought to look at affirmative action as "not
rebutting the claim of special treatment, but by pointing to the
need for such treatment.Y Justice Marshall found that bringing
into the mainstream of American life those who were
disadvantaged in the past to clearly be a compelling state interest
and one that is "of the highest order."' 6 As a way of achieving
this goal Justice Marshall advocated applying an intermediate
standard of judicial review to measures that took race into
consideration.' He also sought to further distinguish between
governmental actions that are themselves racist and those that
seek to remedy "prior racism or to prevent neutral government
activity from perpetuating the effects of such racism."88 Upon
his passing, the affirmative action movement lost one of its
greatest and most ardent supporters.
THE STATUS
TODAY

OF

AFFIRMATIVE

ACTION

PLANS

While heralding Hopwood as the death knell for affirmative
action plans amounts to media fed catastrophizing, the effect of
the decision should not be underestimated. The decision of the
Fifth Circuit is legally binding only upon those states within its
boundaries. 9 However, in the absence of any direction from the
Supreme Court in this specific area since the convoluted Bakke
I See generally Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989),
City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
84 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 396. Justice Marshall cites the 1873 Slaughterhouses
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wal) 36, where it was stated, "in any fair and just
construction of any section or phrase of these [Civil War ] amendments, it is
necessary to look to the purpose for which we have said was the pervading
spirit of them all, the evil which they were designed to remedy." Id.
8 Id.
86 id.

8 Croson, 488 U.S. at 551.
1 Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1327 n.1 (distinguishing between "hard" and
"soft" remedial measures).
s9 The Fifth Circuit is comprised of Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas.
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decision twenty years prior, and with the case failing to be
granted certiorari, the decision was likely to be noticed by the
admission policy makers across the country. At the time the
decision was handed down, one commentator stated that if
extended nationally, Hopwood "would be a big deal indeed" and
that at a minimum the decision "will force every college, every
medical school, every law school.., to review their
procedures. "9'

In general terms, Adarand tells us quite clearly that strict
scrutiny must be applied when assessing the constitutional validity
of any race-based classifications. The crucial question thus
becomes what goals are to be considered compelling enough and,
further, what means will constitute a tailoredenough plan used to
achieve that classification's ends? This is the precise location at
which the various jurisdictions separate and end up with different
results to essentially similar issues. For example, the Hopwood
Court flatly rejected the goal of diversity to be, in and of itself, a
compelling enough state interest to satisfy the first prong of the
strict scrutiny standard. The Hopwood Court did not feel bound
to follow Justice Powell's solitary opinion in Bakke that promoted
diversity of the student body as a sufficient governmental interest
because they believed later cases rejected this idea. 9
A Ninth Circuit District Court found diversity to be a
compelling interest in an interesting case about a special
elementary school's race-based admission policy. In Hunter v.
Regents of the University of California,92 the school's admission
policy was upheld as being necessary to achieve the school's
stated purpose of rendering scientific studies of educational
techniques.93 The Hunter court found a compelling state interest
in allowing the school to operate as a "laboratory" for
educational studies. In addition, the Hunter court felt that the
school's goals - namely to conduct research and disseminate
9 Joseph Silver, Law School Affirmative Action In Doubt, ABA JOURNAL,
June 15, 1990, at Al.
91Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945 (citing Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2097).
' 971 F. Supp. 1316, 1328 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
93 Id. at 1327.
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information regarding potential innovations in urban elementary
educational methods, were achieved by an admission plan that
was narrowly tailored in that no other methods would work as
effectively and that the plan didn't "unnecessarily trammel " the
rights of others.""94 The Hunter court, after acknowledging the
reasoning of the Hopwood Court, nonetheless declined to follow
its predicts. 95 In Podberesky v. Kirawan,9 the Fourth Circuit
wrote that a University that had chosen a scholarship program
that was open only to black applicants "stands before us burdened
with a presumption that its choice cannot be sustained."' The
Kinvan court ultimately found the scholarship plan to be
unconstitutional in that it used a general societal discrimination as
the basis of its justification. 9 Further, the scholarship program
failed as being not narrowly tailored (under-inclusive) because it
was designed to attract only high-achieving black students when
"high achievers, whether African-American or not, are not the
group against which the University was claimed to have been
discriminatory in the past." 99
What then would a race based affirmative action plan consist of
in order to survive a constitutional challenge? One would start
with a recitation of basic factual principle regarding equal
protection. Whenever persons similarly situated are treated
differently on the basis of race under the law, the level of review
employed by a reviewing court is that of strict scrutiny - the
interest at stake must be a compelling state interest and the means
chosen to achieve that interest must be narrowly tailored to that
end."°° The compelling state interest must be one that the
reviewing court is willing to recognize.' 0 ' Further, the narrow
tailoring prong of strict scrutiny review requires that the means
chosen are necessary; the objective can be achieved in no other
94 Id. at 1328.
95 Id. at 1332.
96 38 F.3d 147
97 Id. at 152.
981Id.
at

(4th Cir. 1994).

155.

99 Id. at 158.
100 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
I10
See generally Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1995).
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less obtrusive way. In order for a school to withstand a
constitutional challenge to its admission policy, it must be able to
show that both aspects of the test are satisfied. A compelling state
interest put forth by the policy of "exposure to a wide variety of
social and political interests to enhance the educational
Although Bakke was never
experience" will not suffice.
expressly overruled, one nonetheless must adopt the logic of the
Fifth Circuit in Hopwood, where it was noted by the court that
Justice Powell's argument in Bakke "never represented the view
of the Court in Bakke or in any other case." " Further, the
Supreme Court in Adarand flatly rejects Justice Powell's
"formulas of analysis articulated in Bakke" '0 and expressly states
that racial characteristics "seldom provide a relevant basis for
disparate treatment.'04
From the various court decisions discussed it appears that the
only forms of racial classifications that will survive the Court's
strict judicial review would be instances which present the Court
with a remedy for a specific racial group that had actually been
harmed by the racist policies of the actor from which they seek
redress. From Croson we know that a "generalized assertion"
that there has been societal discrimination in the past will not be
sufficient to establish a compelling state interest. 5 Further, the
program would have to ensure that this group, and only this
group, would receive assistance and then the assistance would last
only until the harms suffered had been recompensed. Under
Adarand,"' any program that over compensates, or includes other
groups not harmed in the past, would be held to be invalid.
The topicality of the affirmative action debate could not be
greater, as evinced by the recent Time magazine cover story"
"Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
'°3 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.

Id. The Court goes on to say that "we think that requiring strict scrutiny
is the best way to ensure that courts will consistently give racial classifications
104

that kind of detailed examination, both as to ends and to means." Id.
105
'06

Croson, 488 U.S. at 498.
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (holding all racial classifications be

subjected to strict scrutiny).
'07 TIME, June 23, 1997, at 48.
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and a graduation address by President Clinton dedicated to
expressing the need for continued affirmative action programs.,"
In the specific area of admission policies of institutions of higher
education, Bakke remains problematic in that a clear direction
cannot be extracted from its multiple opinions. For those who
share President Clinton's view however, another case will have to
come along to overrule, or at least modify, Adarand and its
requirement that strict scrutiny be applied when analyzing racebased classifications. And, despite the Court's assurances
otherwise, 1' 9 this level of review, if not fatal, certainly has proven
life-threatening.
David J. Jannuzzi

103See

NEW YORK TIMS, June 15, 1997, at Al.

Interestingly, President

Clinton chose the University from which the Bakke litigation was born as the
site at which to give this speech.
1
09SeeAdarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
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